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1. Introduction 
Climate shocks can destroy crops, livestock and other productive household 
assets. The risk of such shocks can induce households to pursue livelihood 
strategies that constrain wealth accumulation.1 Thus, exposure to adverse 
climate events has both ex post and ex ante impacts on the incidence of 
poverty. Many rural households in low-income countries list weather risk as 
their number one concern. Weather risks and climate shocks are critically 
important constraints to wealth accumulation, particularly for those in rural 
areas who are either engaged in agricultural activities or have their livelihoods 
tied to the well-being of the farming sector. This paper examines these 
important issues by integrating diverse literatures on a wide range of related 
topics that enhance our understanding of how weather risks and climate shocks 
impact both poverty and development. That understanding is used to enlighten 
our evaluation of the potential developmental role of innovations in index-
based risk financing for catastrophic weather shocks.  
The combination of considerable ex post, observable losses due to climate 
shocks and the likewise-substantial, albeit less-obvious opportunity costs of ex 
ante climate risk management likely play an important role in perpetuating 
extreme rural poverty in developing countries. A dearth of financial market 
instruments compounds the problems of ineffective and inefficient ex ante and 
ex post strategies to manage and cope with climate risks and shocks in 
developing countries. Poor households in rural areas in developing countries 
often lack access to formal financial markets that can facilitate consumption 
smoothing. And while microfinance has shown significant promise in some 
settings, the success has been limited in rural areas and for farming activities 
that require longer-term loans than is customary for microfinance (Armendáriz 
and Morduch 2005). In many cases, missing insurance markets for climate risk 
can explain why lenders are reluctant to lend or why they charge high interest 
rates to those engaged in inherently risky enterprises such as farming. 
Advances in climate risk transfer mechanisms could crowd-in broader access to 
financial services among the poor.  
                                                     
1 We use the terms “risk” to denote an uncertain outcome and “shock” to mean an 
adverse realization of a stochastic variable. Risk is thus an ex ante concept and shock 
an ex post one. For our purposes, shocks include slow onset events such as droughts 
even though the word shock generally communicates something that is more sudden.  
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The objective of this paper is to frame the key issues and summarize the 
current state of knowledge about and innovations in index-based risk transfer 
products (IBRTPs) as they relate to the management of climate risk for poverty 
reduction, especially of chronic or persistent poverty. In the past several years, 
interest in and experimentation with weather index insurance and other IBRTPs 
has grown rapidly. Though no one should expect that these innovations alone 
can solve the problem of chronic poverty, index-based financing opens up a 
range of intriguing possibilities. 
The remainder of this paper is comprised of five major sections that 
discuss:  
1) how weather risks and climate shocks impact the poor in developing 
countries;  
2) the concept of poverty traps, highlighting how conventional risk 
management strategies typically do not work well for managing 
covariate weather risk;  
3) the limitations and opportunities of financial innovations using index-
based risk transfer products (IBRTPs) for reducing or transferring 
weather risks and climate shocks; 
4) a poverty traps-based typology of IBRTPs; 
5) key remaining challenges in developing and implementing index-based 
risk financing for use in the global struggle to end chronic poverty. 
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2. Background on Weather Risks and Climate Shocks 
Climate shocks associated with extreme weather events—e.g., cyclones, 
drought, floods, hurricanes, typhoons—devastate poor communities with 
distressing frequency. While natural disasters rose sharply worldwide over the 
last decade, the biggest rise was in low-income countries, which suffered an 
increase of disaster incidence at twice the global rate (IFRCRCS 2004). This 
reflects spatial patterns in human, animal and plant diseases, and pests, but 
especially in climate patterns because weather-related disasters outnumbered 
geophysical disasters by nine to one over the past decade. Drought and flooding 
impact more people worldwide than other types of natural disasters.  
Weather-related disasters disproportionately affect rural peoples and the 
agriculture sector through drought and flooding, the effects of which are 
compounded by less reliable physical and institutional infrastructure for 
responding to shocks. These patterns are aggravated by spatial inequality in 
the coverage and effectiveness of public and veterinary health systems, which 
strongly favor richer areas. Overall, people in low-income countries are four 
times more likely to die due to natural disaster and cost per disaster as a share 
of GDP are considerably higher in developing than in OECD countries (Gaiha and 
Thapa 2006). While hard evidence on within-country variation is scarce, 
anecdotal evidence suggests this pattern is mirrored within developing 
countries, with poorer, rural areas more vulnerable to weather-related 
disasters than are wealthier and more urban areas. And at the household level, 
evidence from drought in Ethiopia and hurricane Mitch in Honduras indicates 
that the medium-term effects of shocks vary by initial wealth, with poorer 
households feeling the adverse effects more acutely and for a longer period 
(Carter et al. 2007). Changing weather patterns appear likely to further 
increase the frequency and intensity of adverse weather events (IPCC 2007). 
There is widespread awareness of the losses directly inflicted by climate 
shocks, of the severe disruption of livelihoods that occurs due to dampened 
crop yields and livestock productivity, damaged infrastructure that impedes 
commerce, and destruction of the few productive assets the poor possess—their 
land, livestock, homes and businesses. The epidemiological consequences of 
weather-related disasters, due to predictable, if transitory, increases in water- 
and insect-borne disease transmission compound the losses and precipitate 
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human health shocks that are especially strongly associated with long-term 
collapse into poverty (Gertler and Gruber 2000; Krishna 2006). Furthermore, 
catastrophic weather shocks can trigger destructive coping responses, such as 
withdrawal of children from school, distress sale of assets, severe reduction of 
nutrient intake, refugee migration and crime, that further contribute to severe 
human suffering. The adverse impacts of the immediate shock or the 
subsequent behavioral response often persist as children’s physical growth 
falters, children fail to return to school, and household productivity, asset 
accumulation and income growth are dampened (Dercon and Krishnan 2000; 
Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Dercon and Hoddinott 2005; Hoddinott 2006).  
These well-known, ex post effects of adverse climate shocks understate the 
damage done to the poor by climate risk, perhaps quite substantially. The 
reason is that people routinely undertake costly behaviors as a means of 
reducing their exposure to uninsured risk. In the case of climate risk, poor 
farmers routinely apply less fertilizer and are less likely to use improved seed 
than they might if they had greater confidence in the quality of the coming 
growing season. They invest less in building up businesses, farms, and herds 
than they might if there were less uncertainty about whether nature might rob 
them of these hard-earned gains. The poor’s ex ante risk management 
behaviors thereby commonly tradeoff expected gains for reduced risk of 
suffering catastrophic loss. These opportunity costs of risk avoidance seem 
greatest for poorer peoples whose risk aversion also appears, on average, 
greater than that of better-off neighbors.  
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3. Poverty Traps: The Roles of Risk and Financial Markets 
Failures2 
As poverty research has evolved over the past decade or two, increased 
attention has been paid to how well-being evolves over time, with much 
interest in resolving the important puzzle of why some individuals, households, 
communities and nations remain mired in extreme poverty for extended 
periods and how others are able to avail themselves of new market and 
technological opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty (Baulch and 
Hoddinott 2000, Barrett, Carter and Little 2007). Increasingly, the former 
experience has become summarized as a “poverty trap.” This concept has 
proven extremely influential in development policy circles, perhaps most 
clearly manifest by the UN Millennium Project (2005) and Sachs (2005). 
This section offers a brief, nontechnical discussion of the poverty trap 
concept, emphasizing in particular the salience of covariate risks, such as 
weather risk, to the existence of particular types of poverty traps. Hence the 
importance of attempting to improve climate risk transfer as part of a strategy 
for reducing the chronic poverty associated with poverty traps. 
3.1. Threshold-based poverty traps and the salience of risk 
In the economics literature, there exist multiple sorts of poverty traps 
associated with different mechanisms by which these might emerge (for 
details, see Barrett and Swallow 2006; Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff 2006; Carter 
and Barrett 2006; Azariadis and Stachurski, forthcoming). One special class of 
poverty traps requires the existence of multiple dynamic equilibrium, at least 
one of which lies below a standard poverty line. This particular sort of poverty 
trap is especially relevant to risk transfer because it is characterized by at 
least one critical threshold above which the expected dynamics of the system 
are characterized by asset accumulation (i.e., growth and improvements in 
standards of living) and below which decumulation prevails. Threshold-based 
poverty traps characterized by such bifurcated wealth dynamics make risk 
especially salient to understanding the dynamics of poverty and growth.  
                                                     
2 This section draws heavily on Barnett et al. (2006) and Carter and Barrett (2006). 
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In a world without multiple dynamic equilibria, everyone follows a growth 
path towards a unique, long-run standard of living. Different individuals, 
households, communities and nations might accumulate wealth at different 
rates and there may be temporary disruptions along the way due to various 
shocks, even different equilibria for different cohorts.  But in such a world 
shocks should have no permanent effect as people and nations adjust and 
converge to their natural equilibria; although this can take some years. In this 
setting, risk merely adds noise to the inexorable process of convergence. 
By contrast, shocks can have permanent consequences in the presence of a 
critical threshold, knocking people from one growth path onto another. Shocks 
that push people below the threshold can set them onto a downward spiral into 
destitution from which they do not recover, or keep them from growing their 
way out of persistent poverty by regularly knocking them backwards as they 
struggle to climb out of the trap, a real-world Sisyphean tragedy (Dercon 1998; 
McPeak and Barrett 2001; Dercon 2005; Carter and Barrett 2006; Krishna 2006; 
Santos and Barrett 2006a; Carter et al. 2007). People’s response to shocks can 
likewise help trap them in poverty.  Empirical evidence suggests that poor 
households commonly liquidate assets in order to cope with shocks, which 
often drops people into persistent poverty (Krishna 2006).  Extremely poor 
households often choose to forego consumption rather than further liquidating 
their limited assets; they smooth assets rather than consumption (Zimmerman 
and Carter 2003; Barrett et al. 2006, Hoddinott 2006, Kazianga and Udry 2006). 
Such a decision may require reduced expenditures on school fees (i.e., 
removing children from school), health care or food consumption (Morduch 
1995; Foster 1995; Barrett et al. 2006; Hoddinott 2006; Carter et al. 2007). 
Resulting health and educational deficiencies can reduce the value of human 
assets, further trapping the household in poverty (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; 
Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Dercon and Hoddinott 2005; Thomas et al. 2004; 
Hoddinott 2006). 
Knowing these prospective consequences of shocks, people may go to 
extraordinary lengths to manage risk exposure, for example by selecting low-
risk, low-return asset and activity portfolios that reduce the risk of greater 
suffering but limit growth potential and investment incentives (Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1989, 1990; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Morduch 1995; Bardhan, 
Bowles and Gintis 2000; Zimmerman and Carter 2003, Dercon 2005; Carter and 
Barrett 2006, Elbers et al. 2007). For example, farmers in riskier environments 
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in South India choose asset and technology portfolios that are less sensitive to 
rainfall variation but also less profitable, such that portfolio choices associated 
with a one standard deviation change in the variability of the date of the onset 
of the monsoon lead to a 35 percent decline in the profitability of production 
for the poorest quartile but only 4.5 percent on average (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger 1993). 
Because risk aversion is typically negatively related to wealth, poorer 
people are typically more likely to select livelihood strategies partly for risk 
avoidance purposes (Dercon 1996, Ellis 2000), reinforcing inherited patterns of 
chronic poverty.  Risk also tends to discourage both adoption of improved 
technologies (Feder, Just and Zilberman 1985, Marra, Pannell and Abadi 
Ghadim 2003) and the short-term sacrifices necessary for longer-term 
investment in productive capital accumulation (Barrett, Carter and Ikegami 
2007). The resulting foregone gains can be considerable. For example, an 
improved method of rice production increases estimated average output by 
more than 84%; yet the increased estimated yield risk associated with the new 
technology makes it unattractive to small farmers within usual ranges of 
relative risk aversion, thereby helping explain the very modest uptake of the 
new method (Barrett et al. 2004). 
And because risk exposure leaves lenders vulnerable to default by 
borrowers, uninsured weather risk commonly limits access to credit, especially 
for the poor who lack collateral to guarantee loan repayment.  The 
combination of conservative portfolio choice induced by risk aversion that is 
strongly associated with poverty and credit market exclusion because risk 
exposure dampens lenders’ willingness to lend help perpetuate poverty. 
Risk can thus have two distinct, crucial effects in a system characterized by 
multiple equilibria. First, ex ante efforts to reduce risk exposure can dampen 
accumulation – either voluntarily or through credit rationing – thereby creating 
a low-level equilibrium. Second, the ex post consequences of a shock—both the 
shock’s direct biophysical effects or those due to coping strategies taken in 
response to the shock—can knock vulnerable people back into a poverty trap.  
3.2. The importance of financial markets failures 
Of course, if financial markets permit people to insure against shocks ex 
ante or to borrow ex post so as to achieve quasi-insurance through ex post loan 
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repayment (rather than ex ante insurance premium payment), these adverse 
effects of risk should be attenuated or eliminated and risk need not contribute 
to the existence of poverty traps. Unfortunately, credit and insurance are 
routinely undersupplied in low-income areas, especially to poor people, partly 
due to uninsured risk. Financial market failures thereby contribute both 
directly and indirectly to the persistence of chronic poverty (Carter and Barrett 
2006; Barrett 2007; Skees and Barnett 2006). 
Formal financial failures arise due to several factors. Three are of 
particular relevance to the present discussion: covariate risk, asymmetric 
information, and high transaction costs. Spatially-correlated catastrophic losses 
can exceed the reserves of an insurer or lender, leaving unsuspecting 
policyholders or depositors unprotected. Such covariate risk exposure explains 
why crop insurance policies are generally available only in countries where 
governments take on much of the catastrophic risk exposure faced by insurers 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Miranda and Glauber 1997). Covariate risk 
due to weather is a major cause of financial market failures in many low-
income countries (Besley 1995).  
The economics literature identifies two primary types of asymmetric 
information problems: adverse selection (or hidden information) and moral 
hazard (or hidden action). Adverse selection occurs when potential borrowers 
or insurees have hidden information about their risk exposure that is not 
available to the lender or insurer, who then becomes more likely to 
erroneously assess the risk of the borrower or insuree (Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1976). Those who are misclassified to their benefit (detriment) are more (less) 
inclined to borrow or purchase insurance. As a result the credit or insurance 
program is likely to experience losses that exceed the projections used to 
establish lending and premium rates, inducing pricing adjustments that only 
compound the problem, leading to an even more adversely selected group of 
insurance purchasers. Unless the underlying information asymmetry can be 
addressed, adverse selection will cause financial markets to fail. Furthermore, 
it is costly to address these problems.  
Moral hazard, the second common asymmetric information problem, occurs 
when, as a result of borrowing or purchasing insurance, individuals engage in 
hidden activities that increase their exposure to risk, leaving the lender or 
insurer exposed to higher levels of risk than had been anticipated when 
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interest or premium rates were established. Unless the lender or insurer can 
effectively monitor individuals’ behavior so as to enforce policy provisions, 
moral hazard will also cause financial markets to fail. 
The transaction costs of financial contracting in rural areas are much higher 
than in urban areas due to limited transportation, communication, and legal 
infrastructure (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986), and higher for smaller 
contracts than larger ones, often leading to credit and insurance rationing in 
equilibrium (Carter 1988). Thus, high transaction costs that emerge due to both 
the high cost of delivery (and loss adjustment in the case of insurance) and the 
necessary information systems to control adverse selection and moral hazard 
are another important cause of insurance market failure in rural areas of low-
income countries. 
Because formal insurance and credit markets are limited in rural areas of 
most low-income countries, people tend to rely heavily on informal risk 
management tools instead.  In particular, people use a wide variety of informal 
risk transfer mechanisms to smooth consumption in rural areas of low-income 
countries (Besley 1995). These mechanisms vary from socially-constructed 
reciprocity obligations within family, village, religious community, or 
occupation (Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Townsend 1994, 1995; Rosenzweig 
1988; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Grimard 1997) to semi-formal microfinance, 
rotating savings and credit, or state-contingent loan arrangements (Udry 1994; 
Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). These family and community oriented mechanisms may 
be better able to address the asymmetric information and transaction costs 
problems that plague formal insurance and credit markets (Arnott and Stiglitz 
1991; Udry 1994; Stiglitz 1990; Rosenzweig 1988). However, social factors can 
prevent reciprocity obligations from functioning as effective mutual insurance 
(Platteau 1997). Moreover, these informal mechanisms tend to fail in the 
presence of large covariate risks (Zimmerman and Carter 2003; Townsend 1994; 
Rosenzweig 1988; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon 1996) and can be 
compromised by the existence of threshold-based poverty traps (Santos and 
Barrett 2006b). 
Informal risk transfer mechanisms must tradeoff asymmetric information 
and transaction costs problems against covariate risk exposure. The more (less) 
geographically proximate the participants, the fewer (more) the asymmetric 
information and transaction costs problems but the higher (lower) the exposure 
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to spatially covariate risk (Grimard 1997). There is also evidence that access to 
these informal mechanisms is positively related to existing wealth (Jalan and 
Ravallion 1999, Santos and Barrett 2006b, Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett 2007). 
This is not surprising since the poorest of the poor would have little to offer 
family- or community-based mutual aid institutions and tend to be less well 
integrated into social networks than their better-off neighbors.  
It is important to note that many of the factors that contribute to poverty 
traps at the household level (e.g., barriers that create scale economies and 
limited access to insurance or credit) can also exist at more aggregate levels of 
analysis (Barrett and Swallow 2006; Barrett et al. 2006). Poverty traps at higher 
levels of aggregation necessarily constrain economic opportunities at lower 
levels of aggregation and thus, accentuate poverty traps at the household level 
(Carter and Barrett 2006; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2005).  For example, 
governments that cannot easily finance safety nets to respond to major climate 
shocks shift households’ accumulation patterns (Barrett, Carter and Ikegami 
2007), limiting the tax base from which the state can raise funds.  Finding 
solutions to covariate climate risk for individuals but also for larger-scale 
institutions (firms, NGOs, governments) is thus central to strategies to liberate 
people from poverty traps. This is where IBRTPs open up new opportunities. 
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4. Climate Risk Reduction and Transfer: The Promise of IBRTPs 
A variety of means other than index-based financing exist for reducing or 
transferring the climate risk faced by the rural poor. As we discuss below, it is 
important to think about suites of tools for managing different layers of risk.  
Thus before moving into a more in-depth discussion of IBRTPs, we must first 
briefly acknowledge other, inherently complementary approaches to climate 
risk management for the rural poor. 
Much of the international agricultural research community is organized 
around the objective of improving technologies so as to protect assets (e.g., 
livestock) and stabilize and increase expected incomes in the face of stochastic 
weather patterns.  Continued technological improvement is a foundational 
strategy for helping the poor reduce climate risk and has a longstanding history 
of high returns on investment (Alston et al. 2000).  Similarly, livelihood 
diversification has long been practiced by rural households seeking to assemble 
asset and activity portfolios that reduce climate risk exposure (Ellis 2000).  The 
objective of climate information systems is likewise to reduce uncertainty 
through forecasts of upcoming weather patterns, timely and accurate reporting 
of current weather conditions, or climate-based prediction of phenomena of 
more direct interest to affected populations. Finally, efforts to improve market 
integration through improved storage, transport and communications 
infrastructure and policies to encourage competition among traders have 
likewise been a central strategy for transferring price risk through trade across 
space and time so as to dissipate supply disruptions caused by climate shocks.  
These tools remain important to holistic approaches to address climate risk for 
poverty reduction.  But the emergence of index-based risk financing creates 
new possibilities worth seriously exploring.  The remainder of this section 
explores these opportunities, as well as the limitations inherent to these 
products and implementation and upscaling challenges that exist. 
4.1.  Index-Based Financial Instruments: Emerging Products and 
Opportunities3 
The objective of index-based financial instruments is to transfer risk so that 
it is allocated in a more economically and socially desirable fashion. Index-
                                                     
3 This section draws heavily on Barnett et al. (2006). 
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based risk transfer products (IBRTPs) are financial instruments that make 
payments based on realizations of an underlying index relative to a pre-
specified threshold. The underlying index must be correlated with economic 
losses for IBRTPs to be useful in transferring risk. The principle advantage of 
using this form of risk transfer is that it does not require farm-level loss 
adjustment and can potentially be much less costly than traditional forms of 
insurance. However, the underlying index must be transparent and objectively 
measured. Examples include area average crop yields, area average crop 
revenues, area average livestock mortality rates, cumulative rainfall (to 
capture either drought or excess rainfall), cumulative temperature, flood 
levels, and even the use of satellite images with process models that translate 
these images into data that capture the impact of extreme weather events. 
IBRTPs can take on any number of forms including insurance policies, option 
contracts, catastrophic bonds, or derivatives. Some highly standardized IBRTPs 
are actively traded in secondary markets. However the focus here is on IBRTPs 
that are customized to fit the specific weather-related covariate risk 
management needs of the purchaser and to highlight the potential role of these 
instruments in addressing rural poverty. Those prospective clients and uses are 
multiple, as section 5 explains.  In this sub-section we aim merely to explain 
these products and their promise for helping better manage covariate risk for 
poverty reduction. 
IBRTPs make payments when the realized value of the underlying index 
either exceeds or falls short of a given threshold.4 For example, an IBRTP that 
protects against crop losses would be based on an index that is presumed to be 
highly correlated with farm-level yields. IBRTPs with indices based on 
cumulative rainfall, cumulative temperature, area livestock mortality, and 
satellite imagery have been developed for agricultural producers (Turvey 2001; 
Martin, Barnett, and Coble 2001; Mahul 2001; Miranda and Vedenov 2001; Deng 
et al., 2007; Skees and Enkh-Amgalan 2002). Much recent attention has focused 
on the potential for using IBRTPs in low-income countries to protect 
agricultural assets from losses caused by various climate perils (Sakurai and 
Reardon 1997; Skees 1999 2000; Varangis, Skees, and Barnett 2002; Hess, 
                                                     
4 IBRTPs are conceptually analogous to European options on the underlying index 
(Skees and Barnett, 1999; Barnett, 1999, 2000). The instruments can be constructed as 
“calls” (a payment is made when the realized index value exceeds the threshold) or 
“puts” (a payment is made when the realized index value falls short of the threshold). 
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Stoppa, and Richter 2002; Hess et al. 2005; Skees et al. 2001, 2005; Skees, 
Hazell, and Miranda 1999; Skees, Barnett, and Hartell 2005; Skees and Enkh-
Amgalan 2002; Mahul and Skees 2006)).  
Perhaps the best known examples of IBRTPs have emerged in the Mexican 
public reinsurance program, Agroasemex, that has marketed weather index 
insurance policies to state governments to insure against drought, and which 
has links to the national natural disasters social fund, FONDEN (Alderman and 
Haque 2007). In 2006, 28 percent of the unirrigated cultivated area was 
covered, with the main limitation being the availability of weather stations. In 
Mongolia, private index-based livestock mortality insurance has been developed 
for sale to individual herders, with the government addressing reinsurance 
through a contingent debt facility with the World Bank Group (Alderman and 
Haque 2007, Mahul and Skees 2006). In India, a microfinance institution, BASIX, 
has served as an intermediary between individual rural clients and the 
insurance firm ICICI Lombard and its reinsurers, while a parastatal agricultural 
insurance company, AICI, introduced a weather index insurance product in 
2004. In Malawi, weather-based index insurance covers the loans necessary to 
finance the planting of certified groundnut seeds with payments going directly 
to banks to settle the farmers’ loans (Alderman and Haque 2007); more 
recently, products have been developed for maize growers as well (Osgood et 
al. 2007). As these innovations are still in pilot stage it is difficult to evaluate 
their impacts or their potential for sustainability. In Mongolia, lenders did offer 
lower interest rates to herders purchasing the index-based mortality insurance.  
If an IBRTP is to be effective, the underlying index must meet several 
conditions. It must be highly correlated with the loss being insured against over 
a relatively large geographic area. Sufficient historical data must exist from 
which to estimate the probability distribution of the index. The data must be 
adjusted for any trend (area yield data will almost always have to be adjusted 
for positive technology trends). For example pronounced downward trends in 
rainfall may suggest a localized climate change. This was an issue in some early 
work to develop a drought insurance product in Morocco (Skees et al. 2001). 
When the rainfall insurance products were priced in the market, the trend 
adjustment resulted in lower thresholds for the drought insurance product and 
in higher prices than were expected. As a result, this highly touted index-
insurance product was never launched. Another issue that is critical when 
examining historical data involves testing for hetroskedasticty (increasing 
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variance over time). Of course, if the incidence of extreme weather events is 
increasing over time due to climate change (see below), using a long time 
series of weather data without adjusting for the increase in variance will 
generate IBRTP premiums that are too low. Thus, advanced statistical 
procedures are needed when developing IBRTPs. These procedures can be 
enhanced with climate models that aid in making judgments about whether the 
statistical phenomenon is a short term anomaly or a true artifact of climate 
change or technology trends.  
IBRTPs can obviate several of the problems that bedevil financial 
contracting in low-income rural areas and can thereby help reduce financial 
markets failures that contribute to persistent poverty. Since realizations of the 
index are exogenous to policyholders, IBRTPs are not subject to the asymmetric 
information problems that plague traditional financial products. Thus, moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems should be considerably less than with 
traditional insurance products. Transaction costs are also typically much lower 
since the financial service provider does not have to verify farm-level expected 
yields or conduct farm-level loss assessment. This is particularly important in 
low-income countries that are dominated by households that operate small 
parcels of land. In many countries, these households also produce multiple 
crops and utilize complex inter-cropping systems. It is not feasible to provide 
farm-level crop insurance in these environments as records on yield per parcel 
of land do not exist. Thus, in many settings the only possible form of cost-
effective insurance for climate shocks is likely IBRTPs. More fundamentally, as 
will be more fully developed below, IBRTPs may be used in a number of ways 
that remove catastrophic weather risks facilitating both quick response and 
greater access to financial services for the poor.  
4.1.1. Limitations of Index-Based Financial Instruments 
IBRTPs can also potentially have important limitations. These can be 
grouped into two categories. The first category involves the degree of 
correlation between actual losses and the index underlying the IBRTP. This 
speaks to both a potential basis risk problem and the ability of the developer of 
the IBRTP to understand the nature of the correlated risk problem for a wide 
range of users. These are interrelated problems that require careful attention. 
The other category of potential limitations surrounds important questions 
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about how to design the IBRTP and considerations for how it fits into the larger 
institutional setting in a developing country.  
When IBRTPs are being sold to small households, it is possible that the 
household will experience a loss and not receive a payment or they may 
receive a payment when they don’t have a loss. This type of basis risk exists 
with many risk-management instruments (e.g., hedging using futures or options 
contracts or even with loss-adjusted crop insurance when mistakes are made in 
estimating yield potential). Various studies have empirically examined the 
effectiveness of IBRTPs in the presence of basis risk (Black, Barnett, and Hu 
1999; Vedenov and Barnett 2004; Barnett et al. 2005; Deng, Barnett, and 
Vedenov 2007; Turvey 2001; Martin, Barnett and Coble 2001; Deng et al. 2007; 
Wang et al. 1998). The findings from these studies are mixed. Careful 
construction of IBRTPs can reduce exposure to basis risk. However, for 
heterogeneous regions with many microclimates or with sparse meteorological 
stations for reliable data collection, basis risk may be too high for IBRTPs to be 
effective. It is important to remember that the very characteristic that causes 
basis risk in IBRTPs is also what eliminates asymmetric information problems—
namely, that payments are based on realizations of the exogenous index rather 
than actual losses experienced by the household. Thus resolving one problem 
inherently creates another. Furthermore, if IBRTPs are focused on truly 
catastrophic climate shocks that impact a wide region (a covariate risk), having 
access to even an imperfect IBRTP is likely better than having no insurance. 
The greater the spatial correlation for extreme weather shocks, the more likely 
that IBRTPs will work for a wider range of households, even though the 
households may be impacted differently by the same severe event. At some 
level, extreme weather shocks will negatively impact a large number of 
households. Given concerns about basis risk, it should be clear that for regions 
with varied microclimates or highly idiosyncratic risk, IBRTPs are unlikely to 
work well unless the index can take advantage of high-resolution weather 
observations or proxy data from remote sensing. Under these conditions, 
formal or informal risk pooling mechanisms may be a better alternative. 
However, formal crop insurance markets will also be unlikely to work even in 
these settings due to asymmetric information problems and the associated high 
transaction costs of delivery.  
The other major challenge for IBRTPs involves the details of appropriate 
contract design and the potentially complex issues surrounding 
Working Paper 
Poverty Traps and Climate Risk: 
Limitations and Opportunit ies of  Index-Based Risk Financing 
 
16 
implementation. Simply put, there has been insufficient experience across a 
range of settings to have established a set of best practices for contract design 
and delivery. As Osgood et al. (2007) describe with respect to contracts 
recently developed in Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania, however, the contract 
development and evaluation process has led to a set of contracts that appear 
to have performed well thus far. If this can be replicated in other settings and 
sustained over a cycle of climate shocks, the transactions costs of product 
development and delivery should come down and uncertainty (faced by all 
parties) surrounding contract design risk  should diminish appreciably.  
Design questions are highly related to institutional and implementation 
issues as well. In lower income countries IBRTPs must generally be structured 
as insurance products since regulatory structures for other types of contingent 
claims contracts are unlikely to exist. A proper regulatory structure is critical 
to provide oversight regarding consumer education and insure adequate ex ante 
financing of these special products.  Where such structures are absent, IBRTPs 
are unlikely to prove commercially viable.   
Furthermore, the type of education and promotion that accompanies 
marketing and sales of IBRTPs is critical. It may be ill-advised to present a 
rainfall insurance product as being insurance for a specific crop. This gives the 
wrong impression that the household is purchasing crop insurance. In India, 
ICICI-Lombard has introduced weather products for three distinct periods 
during the growing season. During the planting and flowering period drought 
insurance is offered. During the harvest period excess rainfall insurance is 
offered. Farmers can select any or all of these three periods based upon what 
weather events concern them. These products are not presented as protecting 
against losses for individual crops. Rather they are presented as seasonal 
weather products that can compensate for a wide-range of losses. These could 
extend to losses for those who have livelihoods that are tied to the well-being 
of farming (i.e., laborers who depend on the harvest for income, input 
suppliers, processors, etc.).  
Finally, as these products are put into a larger institutional framework and 
as they are used to provide ex ante financing for disaster aid one must be 
concerned about a prospective dependency problem.  This can be a problem 
even in developed countries. As decision makers anticipate transfers in the 
event of a catastrophe they are less likely to pay for financial services. This 
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problem can be addressed with a proper deign that attempts to layer the risks 
so that protection against the most catastrophic losses are provided as a social 
program and more frequent losses are provided in commercial markets. The 
Mongolia index-based livestock insurance program has been explicitly designed 
to address this issue (Mahul and Skees 2006). 
4.1.2. Implementation and Upscaling Challenges 
Several critical hurdles must be overcome in integrating climate-related 
IBRPs into poverty reduction strategies at a significant scale.  
Capacity building: The first challenge is that capacity for new product 
development and adaptation must transition from global research institutes to 
local stakeholders.  It is not cost-effective for each index insurance project to 
be the product of a research institute. Moreover, the need to build capacity for 
local design and adaptation of contracts increases in importance if the 
insurance is successful in allowing economic development. A product that is 
designed to provide a stepping stone for farmers into the cash economy must 
adapt once these farmers make that transition and begin to establish credit 
ratings and accumulate money in savings accounts. With each step of the 
development process, the insurance tools must evolve with the clientele.  
As the projects upscale from pilots to developed markets many solutions 
that are effective for a particular pilot may not be sufficiently robust or 
scalable for a large scale heterogeneous market.  Thus, it is critical that the 
pace of product upscaling does not exceed the pace of capacity development, 
product communication and project improvement.  If financial stakeholders do 
not have the sufficient understanding and capability to update the products, 
they may not understand the important limitations of index products, and 
farmers may not understand what risks the contracts do not provide protection 
for. This is particularly important for index products, since both the provider 
and client must fully understand that the product does not protect against all 
losses, and must understand how to build risk protection against things the 
contract does not address.  Since in many of the index insurance projects, 
donor participation is focused on product design and the product is completely 
financed by the smallholder farmers, overly rapid rates of scale up may place 
the burden on the smallholder farmers themselves. 
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Interpolation and remote sensing: One barrier to low cost scalability is the 
source of data for indexes.  Weather stations have been used in most of the 
recent pilots in developing countries, though questions remain over how to use 
such information for more widescale products. This is because the weather 
station is a point estimate of the climate. For the Malawi pilot, farms were only 
allowed to take out a policy if they were within 20km of the weather station 
(Osgood, et al., 2007). One aspect of the problem is extrapolation. In the 
above example, the product design assumes simple extrapolation over the 
20km radius. More complex interpolation methods carry with them 
uncertainties in the reliability of risk estimates, which are critical for the 
viability of index insurance products. If an interpolated product uses differing 
numbers of stations over time, then time series at given locations may be 
considered unsuitable for index insurance. Station records also carry with them 
issues of expense. Monthly data are may be more easily available, whereas 
daily data, while often recorded, are generally more difficult to access digitally 
and can be far more expensive. The density of stations required for given 
capture rates of events is an area for further research, but one that could be 
undertaken with a cost-benefit analysis in mind, to estimate the value of 
varying densities of data network. 
Satellite products offer the prospect of spatially continuous information, 
with reliability in real-time provision. Satellite rainfall estimates have become 
more accurate over time since the inception of the first products around 1980 
(Dinku et al., 2007). A problem with satellite data is the shortness of records of 
most of the best products. However, opportunities may exist for merging 
satellite and station data into statistically homogeneous series that could then 
be updated in real time by satellite-only products. So far, indexes based on 
rainfall estimates using satellites are still generally considered experimental 
and not for use in index insurance, although this too is an evolving area as 
research and pilot implementations are being undertaken that may soon alter 
that perception. Indeed, analyses with satellite estimated greenness of 
vegetation (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) have now been sufficient 
to warrant use of that product in index insurance products. The NDVI data 
extend back to the early 1980s at a resolution of approximately 10km, so are 
one of the few examples of a satellite product deemed sufficiently robust and 
to have a record of such length. Even then, there are challenges in changes in 
satellite procedures over time that need to be accounted for with statistical 
corrections (Kalnay et al., 1996). Also, at a scale of 10km, there are often 
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seemingly random fluctuations not explained by climate; indices averaged over 
several pixels are often more robust. There are also issues of the extent to 
which land use changes modify greenness measures and might thereby affect 
the design of robust and meaningful indices.  
Increased sophistication in index development: The low cost development of 
effective indices will be an important task in implementation and upscaling.  If 
the index is too complex, clients may not be able to use it as an effective risk 
management tool, but may end up facing risks that are not addressed through 
other means, and may not even be anticipated.  Therefore, as index 
sophistication increases, the task is not only to decrease basis risk and lower 
development costs, but also to provide simpler, more transparent contracts to 
the end user. 
Alternatives being utilized currently include the water requirement 
satisfaction index (WRSI), which uses a cumulative ratio of actual water use to 
evaporative demand, calculated from a simple soil water balance model, to 
estimate water stress (Frere and Popov, 1979, 1986). An alternative approach 
is to derive a simple combination of rainfall totals during key crop growth 
stages, and calibrating it to WRSI simulations or historical yield data (Bown et 
al., 2000, Hess and Syroka 2005, McCarthy 2003, Skees and Leiva 2005, Varangis 
et al., 2001). Questions also remain concerning the appropriate timescale of 
data aggregation properly indexing risk. There may be gains to integrating new 
sources of data (such as remote sensing) into existing indexes. A key question 
continues to be the extent to which knowledge of climate-crop relationships is 
sufficient to allow meaningful indices to be designed for all locations, given 
that reliable historical records of crop yield are often not available. 
Pilot index insurance projects have focused mainly on drought stress for 
annual crops.  Extension to other potential indices may raise new technical 
issues as each insurable event has its own signature of climate knowledge and 
climate data issues. Perhaps the one with most potential for widely assisting in 
development is flood risk. However, floods are less spatially coherent than 
drought, so the density of data monitoring required is higher for a given level 
of risk capture.  
Seasonal climate forecasts: Forecasts have been shown to provide significant 
skill in predicting seasonal temperature and precipitation in many parts of the 
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world (Goddard et al., 2003, Mason and Goddard, 2001). It is important to 
quantify what skill seasonal forecasts have in predicting the climate risks 
associated with insurance payouts (Hansen et al. 2006).  Forecast information 
has the potential to undermine insurance or weather-linked credit through 
intertemporal adverse selection when premiums are set before, but contracts 
are sold after a forecast becomes available  (Luo et al. 1994).   That is, a client 
should not be able to use forecasts to undermine the financial stability of the 
insurance by purchasing insurance only in years when drought is forecasted. 
This is not an issue in current pilot implementations, for which total demand is 
greater than the pilot size. However, as projects scale up, it becomes 
increasingly important. One option is to close contract sales before forecasts 
are released.  For example, climate modeling work in Peru demonstrated that 
El Nino could be predicted with some accuracy a full 7 to 8 months in advance 
of serious problems (Khalil et al. n.d.). In response to this information, the 
developers of the ENSO index insurance for Peru recommended a sales closing 
of June 15 (Skees, Hartell, and Murphy 2007).   
A second way to address potential adverse selection problems associated 
with weather information (including indigenous forecasting skills) is to organize 
more complex IBRTPs. For example, a multiple year contract that would 
involve rolling the premiums forward may mitigate the adverse selection 
problem for insurance products. One could also consider selling options on the 
right to purchase the insurance. Weather derivative markets can also be used. 
However, in a developing country context, the implications of these solutions 
are complex.  Lenders often use climate information when underwriting loans. 
For example, when forecasts suggest an El Nino will affect Peru, many lenders 
refuse to make agricultural loans, which may be harmful to farmers if lenders 
respond in an overly conservative manner. If lenders could offset their 
exposure to catastrophic weather events using IBRTPs, they may be less likely 
to excessively reduce credit under these circumstances (Skees, Hartell, and 
Murphy 2007).   
It is important to note that variation in credit availability in response to 
weather forecasts may benefit smallholder farmers by more accurately 
reflecting climate-related variation in agricultural risk and thereby reducing 
defaults and losses in bad years and providing easier credit access in good years  
(Osgood, et al., 2007).   Because profit-maximizing input levels vary 
considerably with variations in seasonal rainfall, and are at least partially 
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predictable (Jones et al., 2000), adjusting insurance prices and credit 
availability in response to forecasts may provide a useful market incentive to 
farmers to choose season-specific farming strategies (e.g., crop choice, cultivar 
cycle length, fertilizer application rate) appropriate to the expected weather 
pattern (Carriquiry and Osgood, 2006).  Properly designed, index insurance 
might protect against the uncertainty of the forecast, allowing more effective 
and widespread forecast use.  But the integration of IBRTPs and forecast 
information remains an under-developed area on which research is critically 
important.   
Spatial Structure: Index contracts and reinsurance must be designed 
acknowledging regional and global climate features, since large scale climate 
processes often lead to negatively (or positively) correlated seasonal rainfall 
between regions, across the globe (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987) or even on 
opposite sides of a mountain range (Waylen et al., 1996). For example, an 
ENSO state that is associated with higher probabilities of drought in Southern 
Africa is associated with ample rainfall in the Greater Horn of Africa. By using 
climate science to provide insight into the driving processes, it may be possible 
to identify effective strategies that could not be uncovered simply through 
statistical analysis of the small number of payouts based on historical data 
(Osgood, et al., 2007).  
As the ability to manage risk depends on the scale of the institutions 
involved, the ability to estimate risks with a given data network also varies 
with spatial scale. Increasing spatial scale may average out noise. It may also 
decrease precision in indexing a particular risk. Analyses are needed to 
evaluate the optimum spatial structuring of IBRTPs. For example, if regional 
scale risks are substantially more reliably estimated, then this may a 
worthwhile factor to weigh in with other implementation goals in determining 
the preferred scale of structures for risk transfer. 
Climate change, decadal variation and limited long term data: As a first 
estimate, risks are often evaluated using a so-called burn analysis of the data – 
that is, by simply computing the frequency and magnitude of loss in the 
historical record.  A key question is the extent to which this provides a reliable 
estimate of the risk of the trigger event in a given season. Traditionally, 
climate statistics in the meteorological community are estimated using about 
30 years of data; the lengths of satellite rainfall products starting around 1980 
Working Paper 
Poverty Traps and Climate Risk: 
Limitations and Opportunit ies of  Index-Based Risk Financing 
 
22 
are now approaching this length. However, because IBRTP events are often 
extreme, there is a question over just how reliable estimates of such risks are 
with series of length 30. Fitting statistical distributions and generating large 
samples of data with a parameterized stochastic weather model, consistent 
with climate knowledge, may improve estimates of risks, particularly in the 
tails of distributions. 
The ability to estimate risks in a changing climate is a key issue. Regional 
climates have always varied naturally on timescales of 10-100 years, with 
associated changes in climate extremes (Metha et al., 2006). A rapidly-
changing, anthropogenically-induced climate forcing  is expected to cause 
greater regional climate changes over the next century (IPCC 2007, Solomon, et 
al., 2007), with likely associated changes in extremes (Tebaldi et al., 2006). 
This should increase demand for tools to manage weather risk. At the same 
time, it creates a challenge. For structures that are built around a single 
season or year, updating estimates of risks from past years will likely provide 
only modestly biased estimates of risks for the coming year, provided that risk 
estimates properly account for any past trend or low-frequency variations. 
However, this bias should be quantified and factored into expected payout 
frequencies. Simulation approaches, making assumptions about magnitudes of 
change informed by global model projections, should provide valuable insights. 
The situation is likely most problematic for financial structures with a time 
frame of several years – the statistics of the last 30 years, while providing a 
reasonable estimate of risk for the next year, will likely be more substantially 
biased in providing estimates for the risks over the next 10 years. Since most 
weather index insurance has so far been of the form of policies for the coming 
season/year, the key concern is if the relatively short time-period represented 
by available data can be used to accurately reflect the true probability of 
rainfall in the coming year given the potential for shifting statistics.  On the 
other hand, gradual changes in risk have an important implication for the long-
term affordability and profitability of index-based financial products and hence 
for the willingness of the industry to invest in new markets. 
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5. A Typology of Different Uses for and Users of Climate 
Information and IBRTPs 
This section now integrates the previous two sections’ concepts in order to 
introduce a poverty traps-based typology of three different basic uses for 
climate information and IBRTPs, each associated with a different wealth 
category, product function and set of prospective clients. The aim is an 
integrative framework for understanding how different products and distinct 
threads of the relevant literatures fit together coherently. Current IBRTPs 
target an array of different clients, with some projects designed to offer 
contracts to individuals, and others to farm cooperatives, banks, microfinance 
institutions, or national governments. As implementation projects proceed, it is 
important to better understand the most appropriate roles for different IBRTPs 
within the complete system.  
The distinction between ex ante risk management and ex post risk coping 
and the bifurcated welfare dynamics inherent to threshold-based poverty traps 
provide a natural, unifying framework for coherently integrating the disparate 
literatures on climate information and various IBRTPs proposed for developing 
countries. Some of that literature emphasizes the possibilities IBRTPs open up 
for enhanced humanitarian response to natural disasters (Barrett and Maxwell 
2005, Hess and Im 2007, Chantarat et al. 2007). Other threads of the literature 
focus more on the possibilities for perhaps reducing some of the risk- and 
information-related factors that impede credit and insurance access in rural 
areas of developing countries, and thereby facilitating increased investment 
and uptake of improved production technologies in low-income agriculture 
(Hellmuth et al. 2007, Osgood et al. 2007, Skees, Hartell, and Murphy 2007). 
Since different objectives imply different uses and clienteles for these 
products, there is a certain amount of talking past each other in the extant 
literature as people focus on inherently different uses and markets for 
seemingly similar products.  
This insight is perhaps most easily represented visually. The horizontal axis 
in Figure 1 represents current period wealth, the vertical axis reflects expected 
future wealth, and the dashed 45-degree line therefore depicts all the possible 
dynamic equilibria, i.e., points where expected wealth tomorrow is exactly 
equal to today’s wealth. The solid blue curve depicts expected wealth 
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tomorrow conditional on current wealth.5  That curve provides a heuristic 
representation of highly nonlinear wealth (or welfare) dynamics of the sort 
recently uncovered econometrically in Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa (Adato 
et al. 2006, Barrett et al. 2006, Lybbert et al. 2004, Santos and Barrett 2006a). 
Over the ranges where the blue curve lies above (below) the 45-degree line, 
households are expected to accumulate (decumulate) wealth.  
In this stylized setting, there exist three distinct, stable long-run equilibria, 
or attractors, represented by the circled points labeled 0, 1 and 2. Think of the 
0 equilibrium as an irreversible state of permanent physical impairment—in the 
extreme, death—due to severe physical deprivation. At the other end, 2 
represents a relatively high-level equilibrium associated with significant steady 
state wealth and well-being. In between those two extremes, equilibrium 1 
then represents a low-level but non-calamitous standard of living, the classic 
poverty trap associated with stagnant living conditions, clearly better than 0 
but far less comfortable than 2.  
Between each pair of stable dynamic equilibria there exists an unstable 
equilibrium, at the points marked A and B, where wealth dynamics bifurcate, 
meaning that just above the unstable equilibrium, one is expected to 
accumulate wealth and move upwards, from A towards stable equilibrium 1 or 
from B towards stable equilibrium 2. Conversely, just below the unstable 
equilibria, one is expected to steadily lose assets, converging in the other 
direction, towards the lower-level equilibrium, dropping from A to stable 
equilibrium 0 or from B to stable equilibrium 1. These unstable equilibria are 
the system’s critical thresholds, the tipping points that define poverty traps. 
The existence of such tipping points is the reason risk weighs so heavily on 
people living in systems characterized by poverty traps. Asset or productivity 
shocks that cause one to move suddenly along the X axis can quite 
fundamentally affect the attractor towards which one subsequently proceeds. 
Small favorable shocks that bump someone above A or B can lead to permanent 
improvements in well-being. Conversely, shocks (small or large) that knock one 
beneath one (or both) of those points can precipitate a collapse into 
destitution or worse.  
                                                     
5 Note that this is not fully deterministic, in that actual realizations can be 
affected by random deviations from expected dynamics. But in the interests of keeping 
things simple, we focus just on these expected wealth dynamics.  
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Figure 1: Threshold-based poverty traps and three types of climate risk 
management  
 
This conceptualization of threshold-based poverty traps and risk provides a 
useful typology of three different basic uses for IBRTPs, each associated with a 
different wealth category, function and set of prospective clients. The sub-
sections that follow discuss each of these three types in turn. But let us quickly 
define these in reference to one another using figure 1. The three IBRTPs types 
we discuss are: 
• Type I designed to prevent households from moving below threshold 
A and entering into the abyss of equilibria 0.  
• Type II designed to encourage greater investment in productive 
assets and facilitate movement from low-level equilibria (such as 1) 
to higher level equilibria (such as 2).  
• Type III designed to protect households from the financial 
consequences of adverse shocks, thus preventing movement from 
higher level equilibria (such as 2) to lower level equilibria (such as 
1).  
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Type I uses of IBRTPs serve to block transitions below the unstable 
equilibrium A and thus avert humanitarian disasters associated with collapse to 
the stable, irreversible, equilibrium at point 0. These are safety nets as 
commonly understood: instruments to protect human life and the most basic 
rights to life, food, etc. as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In the context of climate risk management, Type I uses of climate risk 
mitigation methods are essentially famine prevention instruments: IBRTPs for 
pre-financing natural disaster response. Type I uses are targeted at 
compensating for direct losses associated with climate shocks.  
To address the costly ex ante behavior associated with high levels of risk 
aversion among the poor, Type II IBRTPs would be targeted at moving 
households from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2.6  These are cargo net 
interventions7 aimed at helping lift people over the threshold B or enabling 
them to climb over the threshold B. This can happen in either of two ways. 
First, and perhaps most obviously, IBRTPs that resolve credit markets failures 
and thereby enable people to borrow to invest today generate an upward 
movement in current asset holdings, potentially bumping people beyond B and 
onto a new, upward accumulation trajectory towards  higher-level equilibrium 
2. The second, less obvious, effect of IBRTPs is to change the wealth dynamics, 
here represented by an upward movement of the relevant portion of the curve 
to the dotted blue line. Note that this necessarily lowers the unstable 
equilibria and increases the welfare level associated with both the 
intermediate and higher-level stable equilibria. This has the effect of 
increasing the well-being of everyone not in the basin of attraction around the 
catastrophic equilibrium 0 and, most dramatically, of switching onto a positive 
accumulation trajectory those people who were previously just below B but 
now lie just above it in asset space. Barrett, Carter and Ikegami (2007) explain 
and demonstrate how reduced risk exposure (both ex post but especially ex 
ante) fundamentally changes the shape of such wealth dynamics. If IBRTPs can 
be developed so that the poor have greater access to insurance-type products 
when there is a climate shock, they may be more willing to invest in new 
technologies and move to a portfolio mix that has higher risk but higher 
                                                     
6 Since we treat the catastrophic equilibrium 0 as irreversible, upward movements 
out of it are ruled out. 
7 The term “cargo net” in this context was coined by Barrett (2005) who explains 
the concept and its labeling in greater detail. 
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returns. Thus, Type II uses could not only aid the household but could 
contribute to real economic growth for the country.  
The final, Type III uses of climate risk mitigation tools likewise relate to 
safety net functions, but with respect to a quite different population. Now the 
objective is to block downward movements past threshold B, i.e., to protect 
the assets and well-being of the vulnerable, many of whom will currently be 
non-poor. Type III IBRTPs represent what Barrett, Carter and Ikegami (2007) 
term “productive safety nets”, i.e., instruments for safeguarding past 
investments of  those who at some point cinch up their belts and forego current 
consumption to invest in building up productive assets or to adopt improved 
technologies for use tomorrow. By protecting the assets of individuals who are 
able to surmount threshold B—whether by good fortune (e.g., birth into a 
wealthy family or lottery winnings) or by cumulative past sacrifice—Type III 
tools help stem the undesirable entry of new people into the ranks of the 
chronically poor. Although these subpopulations are commonly non-poor, their 
vulnerability to climate risk makes them a natural market for IBRTPs and 
helping keep them out of the ranks of the chronically poor is crucial to any 
effective poverty reduction strategy (Krishna 2006, Barrett, Carter and Ikegami 
2007).  
These three distinct types of tools for climate risk management in the 
presence of threshold-based poverty traps thus focus on different directions of 
movement, different subpopulations within an economy, or both. As the 
Appendix Table clearly documents, such products are emerging rapidly and for 
all three purposes.  Collectively, we could identify at least 21 distinct IBRTPs 
developed or proposed in developing countries as of mid-2007.  The target 
users range from micro-level clients such as nomadic herders and small rice or 
groundnut farmers, to meso-level institutional clients such as water users 
groups or financial institutions, to national governments and United Nations 
agencies. While drought has overwhelmingly been the event triggering most 
payouts, there also exist products targeting flooding, excess rain, and area-
based crop yield or livestock mortality.  The diversity of IBRTPs and the 
rapidity with which they are now emerging motivates our typology, lest people 
grow confused by the plethora of products increasingly on offer. We now 
consider each type of IBRTP in somewhat greater detail.  
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5.1. Type I: Safety Nets for Emergency Humanitarian Response8 
Historically, “most famines in poor economies are associated with the 
impact of extreme weather … [and] the worst famines have been the product 
of back-to-back shortfalls of the staple crop” (Ó Gráda 2007, p.7). While 
weather shocks are neither necessary nor sufficient to induce famine, there is a 
strong historical correlation. And following the Golden Hour principle in 
emergency medicine, rapid response is essential in order to minimize the risk 
of catastrophic results from a shock. The confluence of the strong relation 
between intense, widespread human suffering and weather shocks, and the 
need for rapid response creates important opportunities for IBRTPs to help 
ameliorate or avert humanitarian disasters.  
IBRTPs can be used to pre-finance safety net or disaster assistance 
programs (Goes and Skees 2003; Hess et al. 2005). Weather insurance, in 
particular, offers several different, potentially major improvements to the 
global response to climate-related, slow-onset emergencies such as drought. 
First, insurance by its nature enables the insured to smooth its stream of 
payments. Rather than incurring irregular, massive expenses for emergency 
response, one pays a far smaller amount regularly in the form of insurance 
premia, but receives large indemnity payments when resources are needed. 
Given liquidity constraints and the value to expenditure smoothing, this should 
be advantageous to operational agencies and donors if such insurance can be 
reasonably priced in the market.  
Second, the irregularity of need for famine prevention resources 
underscores the value of insurance for low-probability, high-impact events as 
part of an effective risk layering strategy. Communities can easily absorb 
modest variability in rainfall. For example, migratory pastoralists have 
developed highly adaptive livelihood strategies over many centuries of coping 
with volatile rainfall patterns while crop producers commonly use off-farm 
labor markets to adjust to climate shocks. So a layer of individual and 
community-level self-insurance is feasible. Bigger covariate shocks commonly 
demand some outside interventions. Agencies and donors can readily handle 
small-scale crises within their usual budgets and operational mandates. The 
problem emerges when rare, widespread and devastating shocks occur and 
                                                     
8 This section draws heavily on Chantarat et al. (2007).  
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probabilistically threaten famine. With insurance in place to provide resources 
necessary for such low frequency but potentially catastrophic weather events, 
other actors can focus better on insuring the range of commonplace risks over 
which they possess comparative advantage.  
Third, index insurance would permit an improved and immediate link 
between emergency response and recipient need. With most emergency 
response still based on the provision of food aid that remains tied to 
procurement, processing and shipment from donor countries, drought response 
for famine prevention remains doubly tied: to food as the primary form of 
response and to donor countries as the primary source of that food. Indeed, a 
common quip in Ethiopia is that the availability of food aid depends not on 
whether it rains locally, but on whether it rains in North America. Put 
differently, the supply of food aid—which is a complex function of donor 
country harvests and farm support policies, global prices, freight costs, 
geopolitics, etc.—remains as important a determinant of food aid deliveries as 
is the need of at-risk populations. Current food aid programs are not responsive 
enough to weather shocks, at least partly due to supply-side obstacles that 
could be reduced via the proposed weather index insurance, which links cash 
payouts entirely to predicted humanitarian need. 
Fourth, timely and adequate funding are huge obstacles to effective 
response to slow-onset disasters such as drought. Present disaster financing 
systems tend not to deliver resources in as timely and cost-effective fashion as 
is possible. The United Nations’ Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) attempts to 
coordinate global cooperation in emergency response. On average, however, 
funds raised via CAP amounted to only 56% of requirements by the end of 
October in 2003-6 (OCHA 2007). WFP Emergency Operations (EMOP) covers the 
majority of the humanitarian response, especially related to food security and 
famine prevention. While the WFP experience is better than that of the CAP, it 
too suffers significant shortfalls and delays. On average, only 70% of EMOP 
funding needs were provided by donors in 2001-2006, ranging from 57% in 2005 
to 79% in 2004, and each year, only an average of 36% of EMOP needs were 
confirmed for donors’ contributions by the beginning of June for early 
intervention with as low as 22% need fulfillment in mid 2004 (WFP 2007). 
Moreover, donor contributions take months to arrive. For example, the median 
response time for U.S. emergency food aid is just under five months from the 
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filing of a formal request (a “call forward”) to port delivery (Barrett and 
Maxwell 2005).  
Delays are costly. The costs to operational agencies emerge because as an 
emergency progresses, unit costs per beneficiary increase sharply as more 
expensive, processed commodities become increasingly needed for therapeutic 
feeding, donors pay premia for faster transport (including airlift), and 
populations migrate to camps where broader support costs (e.g., shelter, 
water, medical care) become essential. But there are also major costs to 
populations affected by climate shocks because late-arriving assistance often 
fails to protect their livelihoods.  In such cases, as discussed previously, their 
coping responses commonly include distress sale of productive assets, reduced 
nutrient intake, migration, or some combination of these.  The problem is that 
such responses make them more vulnerable to future shocks. 
In spite of significant improvements in early warning systems, supply chain 
management and other key response functions, operational agency 
interventions continue to lag behind global media reporting on disasters. The 
2004-5 Niger emergency provides a disturbing example. After a November 2004 
international appeal by the Government of Niger and the United Nations, WFP 
initial food deliveries in February 2005 cost $7 per beneficiary. But global 
response was anemic. In June 2005, the Niger situation was relabeled an 
"emergency," and graphic global media coverage in July-August led to a 
sizeable, but slow global response. The cost per beneficiary for WFP August 
deliveries—i.e., the same delivery organization, but with badly delayed 
response—had risen to $23, more than three times the cost six months earlier, 
due to far greater need for supplemental and therapeutic foods instead of 
cheaper, bulk commodities, and the need for airlift and other quicker, but 
more expensive logistics. By enabling rapid payout when the trigger is reached 
rather than merely starting an appeals process likely to drag on for months and 
be only partly filled, IBRTPs can substantially reduce drought response costs 
and provide greater asset protection to affected peoples.  
Finally, because IBRTPs are based on the realization of a specific-event 
outcome that cannot be influenced by insurers or policy holders (e.g., the 
amount and distribution of rainfall over a season), they have a relatively simple 
and transparent structure. This makes such products easier to understand and 
consequently to design, develop, and trade, potentially opening up new 
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sources of finance for emergency drought response and famine prevention. The 
apparent success of pilot programs conducted in Mexico has established the 
feasibility and affordability of such products (Hess et al. 2005). Weather 
insurance contracts underwritten by domestic insurers and reinsured or 
underwritten directly by international investors can provide a new and cost-
effective means to transfer low-probability, high-consequence covariate 
weather risks to global markets where those risks can be easily pooled and 
diversified as part of global portfolios. If rainfall volumes provide a strong 
predictive signal of imminent famine, and thus of looming financing needs for 
emergency drought response, the opportunity exists to design weather 
insurance to facilitate more effective aid response. This opportunity should be 
seized. 
Necessarily, the clientele for early warning information and IBRTPs are 
typically not individuals, especially not destitute people lacking the funds to 
afford safe housing and water and an adequate diet for their families. Rather, 
the customer base is organizations: national or local governments, 
international organizations (e.g., WFP), and prospectively non-governmental 
humanitarian organizations committed to emergency response. Quick disbursing 
funding mechanisms are essential for such organizations in responding to 
natural disasters. The World Bank and IMF have introduced contingency 
financing instruments for developing country governments, although these have 
been utilized infrequently. For example, Emergency Natural Disasters 
Assistance financing offered by the IMF was utilized only 27 times for natural 
disasters between 1962 and 2005 at which time the subsidy rate was increased. 
Recent World Bank loans to Colombia, Ethiopia and Mongolia have included 
within the lending contract weather-conditional grants that disburse only if a 
pre-specified event triggers. 
More innovatively, in 2006 the World Food Program recently insured a 
portion of its emergency assistance exposure to Ethiopia using a French 
reinsurer, AXA Re.9  That contract, costing $930,000, provided for a maximum 
payout of $7.1 million in the event of severe drought. Weather risks were 
quantified in terms of expected income loss by at-risk populations based on 
estimates of the elasticity of crop production to rainfall at different stages of 
                                                     
9 For details, see Alderman and Haque (2007), Hess and Im (2007) 
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crop growth. Crop- and area-specific estimates were aggregated, mapped to 
income via price estimates, and then converted into a livelihood loss index. 
The contract covered the entire agricultural season, consisting of two rainy 
seasons, from March to October, and triggered payment by the end of the 
contract (in October) when data gathered throughout the contract period 
indicated that rainfall was significantly below historic averages, pointing to the 
likelihood of widespread crop failure. The potential for extending similar 
contracts or even improved versions of them (Chantarat et al. 2007) seems 
extremely promising for international organizations, including major private 
relief organizations. 
5.2. Type II: Cargo Nets and Facilitating Exit from Chronic Poverty 
As discussed in section 3, a vast literature explores the effect of risk on 
production behaviors. In general, people adopt precautionary behaviors, 
reducing the use of productive inputs, especially those such as fertilizer or 
improved seeds that are highly responsive to weather conditions, and 
eschewing higher-risk, higher-return technologies and livelihoods. And even if 
they are willing to adopt such inputs or technologies or to invest in 
accumulating risky assets (e.g., cattle or business machinery), lenders are 
commonly unwilling to finance such activities because of the uninsured risk.  
The combination of risk averse behaviors and risk-based rationing of credit can 
trap people in low-productivity equilibria. 
Reducing risk exposure encourages more risk taking, thereby increasing 
expected returns. For example, Hoffmann and Beegle (2007) find that farmers 
who, based on past food aid receipt patterns, might reasonably expect to 
receive food aid in the event of a serious local drought are substantially more 
likely to purchase and plant improved hybrid maize seed than are those who 
lack such de facto insurance. These insured Malawian farmers also reallocate 
labor from lower-return, lower-risk off-farm unskilled wage labor activities to 
on-farm activities offering higher expected return, but with greater risk and 
delay.  
By reducing risk, lenders also become more willing to extend credit.  
Weather index insurance pilot projects in Malawi, Peru and Vietnam have, for 
example, shown that financial institutions and retailers (backstopped by 
financial institutions) can and will lend to lower-income households for 
improved seed, fertilizer and other productivity-boosting inputs when IBRTPs 
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provide some guarantee of ability to pay in the event of bad weather (Osgood 
et al. 2007, Skees, Hartell and Murphy 2007).  Greater supply of credit led to 
lower interest rates offered by lenders in rural Mongolia and Peru.  And by 
reducing individual risk exposure, IBRTPs can also help reduce individual self-
selection out of credit markets due to risk rationing, which has been shown to 
account for a large share of Latin American farmers’ lack of financing (Boucher 
and Guirkinger 2007).  
As the recent BASIX experience in India plainly demonstrates, there clearly 
exist possibilities for direct marketing of IBRTPs to individuals. But empirical 
evidence from even that relatively successful experiment suggests that many 
households do not understand the insurance product, and are therefore not 
inclined to purchase IBRTPs, that insurance contract demand is significantly 
decreasing in basis risk and in the extent to which household liquidity 
constraints bind, and increasing in household wealth (Gine, Townsend, and 
Vickery 2007a,b). These results serve as a caution against over-optimism about 
the potential to develop a broad market for weather insurance among poor 
farmers. Moreover, in many low-income settings, liquidity constraints and high 
distribution costs can prove prohibitive. For example, a recent study in 
Tanzania finds that latent demand for rainfall insurance is less than the 
actuarially fair cost of provision, particularly for low income farmers (Sarris et 
al. 2006). There may be exceptions, particularly through well-functioning 
microfinance institutions, producer marketing cooperatives, or other collective 
action organizations,10 but one should guard against inflated expectations of 
this market.   
Meso-level commercial enterprises, such as agricultural input suppliers, 
microfinance institutions, marketing cooperatives, transportation providers, 
agricultural commodity processors, and retail insurance suppliers, may be 
better targets than individual households for Type II IBRTPs. These institutions 
can, at least to some degree, pool their exposure to household-level 
idiosyncratic risks but often remain heavily exposed to covariate risks (Hess et 
al. 2005; Varangis, Skees, and Barnett 2002; Skees, Barnett, and Hartell 2005). 
In addition, decision-makers within meso-level commercial enterprises are 
                                                     
10 For example, Gine et al. (2007a) find that being a member of a borewell user 
association is the single best predictor of rainfall insurance uptake in rural India.  
Working Paper 
Poverty Traps and Climate Risk: 
Limitations and Opportunit ies of  Index-Based Risk Financing 
 
34 
more likely to have some prior familiarity with contingent claims instruments 
than are household decision-makers (Platteau 1997). 
Consider the case of microfinance institutions (MFIs) or other rural lenders. 
When the losses experienced by borrowers are highly correlated, loan defaults 
are also likely to be highly correlated (Skees and Barnett 2006). To further 
stimulate the availability of rural credit, the government or the international 
donor community could be involved in offering protection against extreme 
losses (Skees, Hartell, and Hao 2006; Mahul and Skees 2006). If governments 
wish to be involved in subsidizing the cost of IBRTPs, those subsidies should be 
focused on the market failure layer. Subsidies for other risk layers are likely to 
generate perverse behavioral incentives that cause even greater exposure to 
adverse shocks.  
IBRTPs can also be used to reinsure portfolios of either index-based or 
traditional insurance policies. In OECD countries, IBRTPs are increasingly being 
used to reinsure portfolios of traditional property and casualty insurance 
policies against covariate risks associated with hurricanes and earthquakes. 
IBRTPs facilitate the transfer of such covariate risks into international financial 
markets. Large investors are attracted to IBRTPs for their diversification value 
since returns on IBRTPs are largely uncorrelated with returns on traditional 
debt and equity investments.  
Although there are good intuitive arguments for bundling of index insurance 
with other contracts (such as loan contracts), particularly for Type II (cargo 
net) interventions, bundling has not been fully addressed in the economic 
theory of contract design.  Through application of contract theory it may be 
possible to use the strengths of the index-based contract to reduce moral 
hazard issues in lending, instead of simply reducing the risk to the lender.  One 
result might be contracts that provide incentives for clients to accurately 
report rainfall, yields, or perhaps livestock disease. 
5.3. Type III: Safety Nets for Preventing Collapse Into a Poverty Trap 
In environments characterized by threshold-based poverty traps, safety 
nets can play another role besides emergency humanitarian response (Type I). 
They can equally protect the productive assets of those who might otherwise 
fall below the critical threshold and thereby fall onto a decumulation path 
towards the lower level equilibrium (1 in the figure above) (Barrett and McPeak 
Working Paper 
Poverty Traps and Climate Risk: 
Limitations and Opportunit ies of  Index-Based Risk Financing 
 
35 
2005; Barrett and Maxwell 2005; Dercon 2005). This Type III use of climate 
information and IBRTPs as safety nets for the vulnerable non-poor is perhaps 
the most familiar, as it essentially standard insurance. .  
Type III safety nets are intended to keep those who experience transitory 
poverty following a negative shock from becoming chronically poor. However, 
few developing countries finance such safety net programs. International 
assistance tends to focus on acute, emergency needs -- rather than on funding 
safety net programs designed to keep households from falling into a vicious 
cycle of asset decumulation. As Barrett, Carter and Ikegami (2007) show, 
productive safety nets that safeguard individuals’ assets above a relevant 
critical threshold from which they can naturally recover and grow back to the 
higher-level equilibrium (2 in the figure above) can generate significantly 
higher GDP and technology adoption rates and lower headcount poverty 
measures than do traditional humanitarian transfers of equal cost in poor 
economies characterized by threshold-based poverty traps.11  Indeed, by 
failing to prevent collapse into poverty traps, traditional humanitarian 
transfers can lead to a relief trap wherein development assistance is 
increasingly channeled toward emergency relief rather than toward investment 
in building or protecting productive assets. Thus, the return on investment in 
productive safety nets to protect the assets of the vulnerable non-poor seems 
considerable, not only for those individuals but for national economies and the 
broader international community. 
IBRTPs can provide reinsurance-type financing for governments or non-
governmental agencies that provide safety nets, much as they can for Type I 
humanitarian assistance.  The main difference is the target clientele.  In this 
case, rather than aiming merely to keep people alive and healthy, the 
objective is to preserve their wealth and thereby to increase the social and 
economic resilience of the community.  Mexico’s FONDEN programs are the 
principle examples of such projects today, combining Type I and Type III uses 
of the IBRTP. 
                                                     
11 The design of the safety net – Do individuals have unlimited access to indemnity 
payments? What is the asset level below which losses are insured? etc. – matters to 
both program cost and poverty reduction impacts. 
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The greater difference from Type I IBRTPs is that the target beneficiary 
population of Type III IBRTPs can typically afford to purchase these products 
just as they offer have (at least latent) demand for asset insurance for their 
homes, businesses and automobiles.  In this case, the perils are related to 
specific events. Such insurance can be required for larger loans for durable 
assets (e.g., business properties, homes, vehicles) or simply to ensure that 
valuable assets offered as collateral to lenders are not foreclosed in the event 
of a climate shock.  Type III IBRTPs can thus be distributed as retail products, 
e.g., through microfinance institutions and other channels to which households 
already turn for financial services. 
Yet Type III IBRTPs are not exclusively suited for individual consumers. For 
example, local governments also have limited ability to withstand covariate 
shocks. Locally provided public goods (e.g., law enforcement, maintenance of 
road and water infrastructure, health clinics, schools) may suffer when public 
assets are destroyed by covariate shocks and/or public resources are diverted 
to relief efforts (Goes and Skees 2003). Shocks that affect critical public goods 
can reduce spatial market integration, thus increasing local price volatility and 
reducing incentives for households to adopt production-increasing technologies 
(Gabre-Madhin et al. 2002). In principle, local governments could use IBRTPs to 
transfer some of their exposure to covariate risks. Alternatively, national 
governments or donor agencies could purchase IBRTPs on behalf of local 
governments. 
A concern sometimes voiced about Type III IBRTPs is that demand for such 
products is inherently distributionally regressive, meaning that richer 
households with more assets to protect and easier access to cash to purchase 
such products are far more likely to make use of IBRTPs for asset protection 
than are poorer households.  Of course, this just mirrors the positive 
relationship between individual wealth and access to financial products more 
generally, so no distinctive problem emerges.  The hypothetical problem is that 
in the event of substantial IBRTP indemnity payments to a large, relatively 
wealthy subpopulation in the wake of a climate shock that reduces local food 
supply, food prices could spike if local food markets are not well integrated 
with broader national or global markets.  Because IBRTP payouts could boost 
aggregate demand, they could hurt poor households, who are far less likely to 
buy such products.  While in principle this may be of concern, in practice, the 
extent of purchase of such products and the coverage  chosen are both likely to 
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be too low to generate any noticeable aggregate demand effect that might 
trigger inflation.  For example, when Mongolian herders were given a choice of 
what share of their herd to insure, the vast majority selected the 30 percent 
minimum and hardly any fully insured their herd against drought loss.  Further, 
concerns about Type III IBRTPs prospective inflationary effects turn on an 
assumption of food markets that are poorly integrated across space and time.  
Yet over the past decade or two, as government control over developing 
country food markets has relaxed and as economic studies have market 
integration have become more statistically sophisticated, the body of evidence 
increasingly points towards reasonably well-functioning markets that quickly 
transmit supply and demand shocks across space and seasons, dampening price 
changes where the principle shock occurs (Fackler and Goodwin 2002, Abdulai 
2007). 
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6. Conclusions 
Risk is a significant factor in the creation and maintenance of chronic 
poverty worldwide, especially in rural areas disproportionately vulnerable to 
natural disasters. The considerable efficiency losses associated with weather 
risk avoidance and the massive – and growing – losses of wealth (and human 
life) associated with climate shocks in developing countries underline the need 
for innovative means to address covariate climate risk.  This has motivated a 
surge of interest in financial innovations associated with new index-based risk 
transfer products (IBRTPs).  Although a burgeoning literature on IBRTPs and a 
plethora of recent or planned pilot ventures in this area have excited much 
interest, and although poverty reduction objectives have been used to help 
motivate IBRTPs in some cases, to date there has been scant effort at 
integrating thinking about IBRTPs with that on the causes and nature of poverty 
traps.  Hence this paper. We offer an synthetic treatment of these literatures, 
culminating in a new typology of IBRTPs based on distinct uses of these 
products in the struggle to avoid or overcome chronic poverty.  
As we have emphasized, IBRTPs can play multiple roles for different 
clientele. First, there is a central role for IBRTPs to help finance emergency 
response. To date, there have been relatively limited attempts to take up 
these opportunities, most notably drought insurance taken out for Ethiopia by 
the United Nations’ World Food Programme and Mexican government contracts 
to provide disaster relief to state governments. There seems considerable 
untapped potential within this type I IBRTP category, with significant scope for 
further innovation through famine bonds and insurance, and related 
instruments (Chantarat et al. 2007). 
Second, IBRTPs can play a crucial role in helping the rural poor escape long-
term poverty by reducing the uninsured risk exposure that both discourages 
their innovation, investment and productive activities and by facilitating 
greater access to credit and on better terms (Skees, Hartell and Murphy 2007).  
Considerable pilot activity is now emerging in this area and bears careful 
monitoring and evaluation over the coming years.  There would seem to be 
substantial possible synergies between these Type II IBRTPs and both 
microfinance innovations and efforts to improve input distribution systems for 
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fertilizer, improved seed varieties and other climate-sensitive commercial 
inputs to smallholder agriculture.  
Third, risk transfer via IBRTPs can reduce the vulnerable non-poor’s 
exposure to catastrophic asset loss, providing a commercially-based foundation 
for either informal or public safety nets or for retail delivery of insurance 
products to a growing middle class that can afford to purchase such products 
but cannot easily recover from catastrophic asset loss due to climate shocks.  
Since long-term poverty reduction depends as much on stemming structural 
movements into poverty as it does inducing permanent escapes from poverty, 
this latter safety net role is equally important for poverty reduction purposes 
even if it is not targeted towards the poorest subpopulations in developing 
countries. 
While the potential of IBRTPs is great, there are inherent limitations 
associated with the degree of correlation between actual losses and the index 
underlying the IBRTP and the institutional settings in which such products 
might be offered in developing countries.  One needs to guard against naïveté 
or over-optimism with respect to IBRTPs; they are but one arrow in the quiver 
of risk management tools needed for addressing the multiple layers of risk 
faced by poor people in developing countries.  Moreover, a range of challenges 
remain to developing and implementing index-based risk financing for use in 
the global struggle to end chronic poverty, some associated with product 
development, adaptation and administration capacity in developing countries, 
others due to technical issues related to data availability, spatial structure and 
statistical inference, and still others associated with the complications posed 
by climate change.  The challenges are significant, but the considerable 
prospective gains associated with IBRTPs for managing climate risk for chronic 
poverty reduction would seem to justify considerable new effort in this area. 
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Appendix Table: Summary of Index-based Risk Transfer Products in Lower Income Countries 
Type Country Risk Event Contract Structure Index Measure Target User Status 
I Bangladesh Flood Index insurance for 
disaster relief 
  In development 
I Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility 
Hurricanes and 
earthquakes 
Index insurance 
contracts with risk 
pooling for reinsurance 
coverage 
Indexed data from 
NOAA and USGS 
Caribbean country 
governments 
Implemented in 2007 
I Ethiopia Drought Index insurance Rainfall  WFP12 operations 
in Ethiopia 
$7 million insured for 2006. 
Policy not renewed for 2007. 
I, III Mexico Natural disasters 
impacting small 
farmers, primarily 
drought 
Index insurance Rainfall, 
windspeed, and 
temperature 
State governments 
for disaster relief. 
Supports the 
FONDEN13 
program. 
Began in 2001. Available in 
26 of 32 states. Currently 
28% (2.3 million ha) of 
dryland cropland is covered. 
Expansion limited by data 
availability 
I, III Mexico Major earthquakes Cat bond and index 
insurance contracts 
Richter scale 
readings 
Mexican 
government to 
support FONDEN. 
Introduced in 2006. Cat bond 
provides up to $160 million. 
Index insurance provides 
additional funding up to $290 
million. 
I Mexico Insufficient 
irrigation supply 
Index insurance Reservoir levels Water users 
groups in the Rio 
Mayo area 
Proposed 
II, III Bangladesh Drought Index insurance linked 
to lending 
Rainfall Smallholder rice 
farmers 
In development. Pilot launch 
planned for 2008. 
II, III Honduras Drought   Rainfall  In development 
                                                     
12 World Food Programme 
13 Fondo por Desastres Naturales 
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Appendix Table: Summary of Index-based Risk Transfer Products in Lower Income Countries 
Type Country Risk Event Contract Structure Index Measure Target User Status 
II, III India Drought and flood Index insurance linked 
to lending and offered 
direct to farmers.  
Rainfall  Smallholder 
farmers 
Began with pilot in 2003. 
Now index insurance 
products are being offered by 
the private sector and the 
government with an 
estimated 300,000 policies 
sold in 2006. 
II, III Malawi Drought  Index insurance linked 
to lending 
Rainfall  Groundnut farmers 
who are members 
of NASFAM14 
Pilot began in 2005. 2500 
policies sold in 2006 pilot 
season. $7000 in premium 
volume. 
II, III Mongolia Large livestock 
losses due to 
severe weather 
Index insurance with 
direct sales to herders 
Area livestock 
mortality rate 
Nomadic herders Second sales season of pilot 
completed in 2007. Offered in 
3 provinces. 14% of eligible 
herders are participating. 
II, III Morocco Drought  Rainfall  No interest from market due 
to declining trend in rainfall 
II, III Nicaragua Drought and 
excess rain during 
production, excess 
rain during harvest 
period.  
Index insurance Rainfall Groundnut farmers Launched in 3 departments 
in 2006. 
II, III Peru Flooding, torrential 
rainfall from El 
Niño 
Index insurance ENSO anomalies 
in Pacific Ocean 
Rural financial 
institutions 
Proposed 
                                                     
14 National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
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Appendix Table: Summary of Index-based Risk Transfer Products in Lower Income Countries 
Type Country Risk Event Contract Structure Index Measure Target User Status 
II, III Peru Drought Index insurance linked 
to lending 
Area-yield 
production index 
Cotton farmers Proposed 
II, III Senegal Drought Index insurance linked 
to area yield insurance 
Rainfall and crop 
yield 
Smallholder 
farmers 
Proposed 
II, III Tanzania Drought Index insurance linked 
to lending 
Rainfall Smallholder maize 
farmers 
Pilot implementation in 2007. 
II, III Thailand Drought Index insurance linked 
to lending 
Rainfall Smallholder 
farmers 
Pilot implementation in 2007. 
II, III Vietnam Flooding during 
rice harvest 
Index insurance linked 
to lending 
River level Smallholder rice 
farmers 
In development 
III Kazakhstan Drought  Index insurance linked 
to MPCI program 
Rainfall Medium and large 
farms 
In development 
III Ukraine Drought Index insurance Rainfall Large farms Pilot launched in 2005, 
discontinued due to 
insufficient sales. 
 
